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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Minnesota, most actions for breach of employment 
contracts are governed by a two-year statute of limitations for the 
 
       †    J.D. Candidate 2014, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S., Economics, 
University of Saint Thomas, 2010.  I would like to thank my editor Mike Tsoi and 
the members of the William Mitchell Law Review for their help and guidance, 
Professor James Hogg for his advice and valuable contribution to this note, and 
especially my family for their unwavering support, encouragement, and patience 
throughout this process. 
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recovery of wages.1  The application of the statute, however, has 
often been complicated by the ongoing wage payments typically 
associated with employment contracts.2  Disputes arising out of the 
employment relationship very often affect the periodic wage 
payments associated with most occupations.3  As a result, Minnesota 
courts have been faced with the question of whether subsequent 
paychecks issued after a breach reset the limitations period.4  The 
courts’ decisions regarding how pay periods affect breaches of 
employment contracts have led to a less than uniform application 
of the statute of limitations.5 
In Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann,6 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court clarified the standard for applying the statute of limitations 
in wage recovery claims.  The court was confronted with the 
question of whether reduced salary payments, occurring as a result 
of an employer’s termination of a company policy more than three 
years prior, started separate two-year limitations periods each time 
payment became due but was not paid.7  The court unanimously 
held that reduced wage payments resulting from a failure to honor 
a policy that alters job responsibilities do not constitute separate 
causes of action with distinct accrual dates and thus do not start 
separate limitations periods.8  The Park Nicollet decision resolves 
some uncertainty surrounding the effect that wage payments have 
on the accrual of breach of employment contract actions, but, in so 
doing, may have adversely impacted employees’ future ability to 
recover benefits owed under revoked or terminated policies. 
This note begins by reviewing statutes of limitations in terms of 
their purpose, origin, and historical development, both generally 
 
 1. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2011). 
 2. See infra Part II.D. 
 3. See infra Part II.D. 
 4. See infra Part II.D. 
 5. Compare McGoldrick v. Datatrak Int’l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897–98 (D. 
Minn. 1999) (holding that when the claim is based on an ongoing nonpayment of 
wages, the cause of action accrues separately each time a payment is due but not 
paid), and Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1989) (holding that 
each failure to pay commission payments when they were due constituted a new 
cause of action from which a separate limitations period would run), with 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Shope, 135 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that 
an employer’s cancellation of stock certificates was not an anticipatory repudiation 
and distinguishing the holding in Levin as only applying to an anticipatory 
repudiation of a future obligation, not to a breach of a present obligation). 
 6. 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011). 
 7. Id. at 832. 
 8. Id. at 837. 
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and in the State of Minnesota specifically.9  Following the general 
and historical review, this note discusses the facts and arguments 
raised in Park Nicollet,10 and then analyzes the decision reached by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court with an emphasis on future issues 
that the decision potentially raises.11  This note concludes by 
arguing that the Park Nicollet decision may unfairly restrict 
employees’ ability to recover benefits owed to them under policies 
that are revoked by employers before employees become eligible to 
receive them.12 
II. HISTORY 
A. Statutes of Limitations in General 
Statutes of limitations are legislatively enacted time periods 
within which various legal actions must be commenced and certain 
rights may be enforced.13  They generally deprive a party of the 
opportunity, after a certain time, to invoke public power in support 
of an otherwise legitimate claim against another.14  The purpose 
behind limiting the time in which to bring an otherwise valid cause 
of action is primarily to prevent the prosecution of stale claims 
where “evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared.”15  Accordingly, policy considerations behind 
such legislation have historically involved weighing the importance 
of providing plaintiffs with a fair and reasonable opportunity to 
litigate their claims against countervailing interests of fairness to 
defendants.16 
 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. 1 HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW 
AND IN EQUITY § 4, at 1 (4th ed. 1916). 
 14. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 
(1950) [hereinafter Statutes of Limitations]; see also Simington v. Minn. Veterans 
Home, 464 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“Summary judgment based 
on a statute of limitations is a decision on the merits and as res judicata, it bars 
relitigation of the same issue.” (citing Nitz v. Nitz, 456 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1990))); Harry B. Littell, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND. L.J. 
23, 23 (1945) (“Anglo-American jurisprudence always has been cautious in cutting 
off claims on bases which do not go to the merit of the action.”). 
 15. McCarty v. Boeing Co., 321 F. Supp. 260, 261 (W.D. Wash. 1970) 
(footnote omitted). 
 16. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1185 (“The primary consideration 
underlying [statutes of limitations] is undoubtedly one of fairness to the 
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B. Origin and Background 
Generally, codified time limitations on actions were 
established in early Roman law17 and then spread throughout 
Continental Europe.  In England, early limitations periods 
prohibited actions based on seisin that occurred prior to a notable 
or well-known date, like the coronation of King Henry II.18  
Eventually, the use of arbitrary dates to limit actions became 
ineffective at reducing the influx of stale claims and gave way to the 
use of fixed time periods, starting with the statute of 32 Henry 8 in 
1540, which limited the time for bringing certain actions pertaining 
to realty.19 
England continued to refine its limitations system to meet the 
needs of a growing society.20  In a further effort to keep 
inconsequential and stale claims out of the King’s courts,21 England 
enacted the Limitations Act of 1623, which, for the first time, 
placed fixed time limits for bringing certain personal actions.22  
The Limitations Act established different limitations periods for 
different types of claims, but generally prescribed a six-year time 
period for the bringing of most personal actions.23  Ultimately, the 
Limitations Act of 1623 marked the beginning of modern 
 
defendant.”); see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463−64 
(1975) (“[T]he period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value 
judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid 
claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale 
ones.”). 
 17. See RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND 
SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 318–22 (James Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1907). 
 18. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 81 (2d ed. 1898) (discussing that as early as 1236, England enacted 
statutes that prohibited real property actions based on seisin prior to the 
coronation of Henry II); see also WOOD, supra note 13, § 2, at 6  (“[T]he legislature 
did not at first fix any certain and progressive period within which actions should 
be commenced, but from time to time chose for that purpose certain notable 
times . . . [such as] the beginning of the reign of King Henry the First, the return 
of King John from Ireland, the journey of Henry the Third into Normandy, and 
the coronation of King Richard the First . . . .”). 
 19. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1177 n.4 (stating that the statute of 
32 Henry 8 limited seisin claims to thirty to sixty years from last seisin of claimant 
or ancestor); see also WOOD, supra note 13, § 2, at 6. 
 20. For further information on the development of statutes of limitations in 
England, see Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1177–78. 
 21. Id. at 1178. 
 22. Limitations Act, 1623, 21 Jac 1, c. 16 (prohibiting actions to recover land 
more than twenty years after the accrual of the right). 
 23. Id.  
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/15
  
376 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1 
limitations on personal actions.24  The substance of the Act, 
including the six-year time period, was eventually copied by many 
of the early American colonies25 and eventually served as the 
foundation for the limitations system of the United States.26 
C. Development in the United States 
The proliferation of U.S. statutes limiting both civil and 
criminal actions continued to evolve from the system inherited 
from England.27  As no uniform federal statute of limitations has 
ever been enacted to standardize the time in which to bring various 
state claims,28 the time for bringing most actions is governed by 
individual statutes found in every state.29  Initially, the various state 
statutes prescribed relatively long limitations periods and only 
differentiated between a few types of actions, leaving most actions 
governed by a “general” statute of limitations.30  Gradually, 
however, individual states began to increase the number of 
categorical distinctions between actions in an effort to tailor 
specific limitations periods to address the particular concerns of 
different claims.31  Ultimately, the state level transition to more 
specific limitations periods also resulted in shorter time periods in 
which to bring most actions.32 
The continuing shift by judicial and legislative refinement 
from longer to shorter limitations periods33 is also believed to be 
 
 24. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1178. 
 25. See, e.g., The Acts and Resolves of Province of Massachusetts Bay for 1770–
71 (providing a period of six years for personal accounts and for debt under 
contract not under seal); The Colonial Laws of New York for 1664–1719, v. 1, 
p. 155 (providing a six-year period for all personal actions of account and upon 
the case).  
 26. John R. Mix, Comment, State Statutes of Limitations: Contrasted and 
Compared, 3 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 106, 107 (1931) (“The substance of [the 
Limitations Act] was copied early in the history of the American Colonies.”). 
 27. See, e.g., N.J. REV. LAWS 263 (1820) (limitations statute enacted in 1796). 
 28. For an analysis of the potential advantages of adopting uniform 
limitations periods under a federal statute of limitations, see Mix, supra note 26, at 
116–17. 
 29. For a detailed analysis and comparison of early state statutes of 
limitations, see Littell, supra note 14, and Mix, supra note 26. 
 30. See Littell, supra note 14, at 32 (“A general limitation is essential since a 
legislature cannot foresee all statutory actions which subsequently will be 
enacted.”). 
 31. Id. at 24. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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consistent with the purpose for which statutes of limitations were 
first enacted.34  In general, statutes of limitations are based on the 
idea that defendants should not be called on to defend claims after 
“papers may be lost, facts forgotten, or witnesses dead.”35  The 
length of time prescribed by statute is arbitrary and does not 
differentiate between just and unjust claims.36  By barring claims 
after a certain period, the statutes compel the settlement of 
disputes within a reasonable time, and the legislature’s codification 
of what constitutes a reasonable time reflects an inherent value 
judgment as to the importance that the state places on the 
expedient resolution of those sorts of disputes.37 
D. Development in Minnesota 
As with most state statutes of limitations around the turn of the 
century, the early limitations statute in Minnesota did not 
distinguish between employment wage claims and general claims 
arising under a contract.38  The early statute simply provided a 
general limitations period of six years that applied to most 
actions.39  It was not until 1945 that the Minnesota legislature 
adopted and codified a separate two-year limitations period for the 
 
 34. See supra Part II.A; see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 
314 (1945) (“Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and 
convenience rather than in logic.  They represent expedients, rather than 
principles.  They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from 
litigation of stale claims . . . .”); Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1185 (“The 
primary consideration underlying [statutes of limitations] is undoubtedly one of 
fairness to the defendant.”). 
 35. Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694, 
697 (1937) (acknowledging that “[a] statute of limitation is based to a great extent 
on the proposition that if one person has a claim against another . . . it would be 
inequitable for him to assert such claim after an unreasonable lapse of time, 
during which such other has been permitted to rest in the belief that no such 
claim existed.”); see Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 
U.S. 342, 349 (1897). 
 36. Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314 (“[Statutes of limitations] are by 
definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just 
and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay.  They have come into 
the law not through the judicial process but through legislation.  They represent a 
public policy about the privilege to litigate.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 37. WOOD, supra note 13, § 5. 
 38. See MINN. REV. LAWS § 4076 (1905), available at 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/statute/1905/1905-077.pdf.   
 39. See id.  The six-year limitations period codified in the early state statutes 
was inherited from the original English Limitation Act of 1623.  Mix, supra note 
26, at 108–09. 
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recovery of wages specifically.40  The adoption of a separate, shorter 
period for wage recovery claims, in Minnesota and elsewhere, was 
likely prompted by growing public concern over strained judicial 
resources caused by significant increases in so-called “portal-to-
portal actions”41 following Congress’ enactment of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938.42  The codification of a separate time period 
may also have been a response to the pending changes in a large 
number of government employment contracts near the end of 
World War II.43 
The newly introduced statutory provision governing the 
recovery of wages greatly reduced the time period for bringing 
employment contract disputes.44  The statute defines “wages” 
broadly to include “all remuneration for services or employment, 
including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all 
remuneration in any medium other than cash, where the 
relationship of master and servant exists.”45  Prior to the 1945 
amendment, these sorts of employee contract claims were governed 
by the six-year period for general contract disputes.46  Minnesota 
courts extended the statute’s reach even further by expressly 
 
 40. Act of Apr. 23, 1945, ch. 513, § 1, 1945 Minn. Laws 1006, 1006–07 
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (1945)). 
 41. “Portal-to-portal action” refers to employee claims for wages associated 
with certain preliminary work activities consistent with the payment requirements 
set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).  The term stems from 
the groundbreaking 1946 Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens 
Pottery Co., dubbed the “portal-to-portal case,” in which the Court held that 
preliminary work activities are properly included as working time under the FLSA.  
328 U.S. 680, 692−93 (1946).  In response to the Supreme Court decision, 
Congress subsequently amended the FLSA with the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 
which defined preliminary and postliminary work activities as those exclusively 
arising out of contract, custom, or practice.  29 U.S.C.A. § 252 (1947). 
 42. Homewood Theatre v. Loew’s Inc., 101 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Minn. 1951).  
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 introduced a forty-five hour work week 
maximum, created a national minimum wage, and guaranteed “time-and-a-half” 
overtime pay for certain occupations.  Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 206–207. 
 43. Kohout v. Shakopee Foundry Co., 281 Minn. 401, 404, 162 N.W.2d 237, 
239 (1968) (“We can only speculate that the statute may have been prompted by 
the pending renegotiation of great numbers of government contracts.”). 
 44. Compare MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (1941) (prescribing a general limitations 
period of six years for general actions under contract), with MINN. STAT. § 
541.07(5) (1945) (prescribing a two-year limitations period for the recovery of 
wages specifically).  
 45. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010). 
 46. See MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (1941) (containing no provision governing the 
recovery of wages specifically).  
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holding that actions for breaches of most employment contracts 
were essentially actions for the recovery of wages and were subject 
to the two-year limitations period,47 thus eliminating any distinction 
between the recovery of wages already earned and future wages due 
under contract. 
In 1984, an exception was included in the limitations statute 
for wage recovery that increased the limitations period from two 
years to three where the employer’s withholding of wages was 
found to be “willful.”48  This exception was presumably enacted as a 
means of further punishing deliberate employer misconduct, but 
establishing whether or not the conduct was willful required that 
the issue be submitted to a fact finder, presumably after some 
period of litigation.49  Whereas most limitations statutes are 
intended to dispose of claims summarily before trial, the inclusion 
of the willful conduct exception means that some wage recovery 
claims accruing more than two years prior to the commencement 
of an action may be fully litigated before determining whether the 
plaintiff had a right to bring suit in the first place.50 
Beyond the 1984 exception, the separate limitations statute for 
wage recovery claims has remained substantively unchanged since 
 
 47. See, e.g., Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 112 F.3d 368, 371 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (“Minnesota courts consistently hold that all damages arising out of the 
employment relationship are subject to § 541.07(5).” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Homewood Theatre, 101 F. Supp. at 77 (stating that the 
legislative history behind the enactment of section 541.07(5) shows that the statute 
was intended to limit all actions for wages, damages, and penalties arising out of 
the employer-employee relationship); Worwa v. Solz Enters., Inc., 307 Minn. 490, 
492–93, 238 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1976) (holding that an action for breach of an oral 
contract of employment was essentially an action for wages and was subject to the 
two-year limitations period set by Minnesota statutes section 541.07(5)); Roaderick 
v. Lull Eng’g Co., 296 Minn. 385, 387–88, 208 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1973) (holding 
that the portion of the claim which had accrued more than two years before the 
commencement of an action based on quantum meruit for the recovery of the 
reasonable value of services performed under an unenforceable oral contract was 
barred by the limitations period in Minnesota statute section 541.07(5)). 
 48. Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 608, § 4, 1984 Minn. Laws 1450, 1454 (providing a 
three-year limitations period for actions where nonpayment of wages was “willful”). 
 49. See Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Minn. 1989) (“Whether 
there has been ‘willful’ nonpayment of wages within the meaning of section 
541.07(5) is not in this case amenable to summary disposition.”). 
 50. See id.  (“Unlike other statutes of repose, which are designed to dispose of 
stale claims summarily, the two tiered limitation provided in section 541.07(5) 
seems almost certainly to demand submission of the question of willfulness to the 
fact finder so that it can be decided which limitation, two years or three, is 
applicable.”). 
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its enactment.51  Consistency in statutory language, however, did 
not prevent issues in the statute’s application.52  Once a court 
ascertained the applicable limitations period, it would then have to 
determine exactly when the limitations period started.53  
Minnesota’s statute provides that the limitations period begins 
when “the cause of action accrues.”54  In the context of wage 
recovery and employment contract disputes,55 however, 
determining when a cause of action accrues has been somewhat 
complicated by the ongoing payments typically associated with 
employment contracts.  This is because many disputes arise and 
continue for an indefinite period during an existing employment 
relationship.  Most employees experience breaches in the effect the 
disputes have on their wage payments.56 
The complexity has boiled down to whether pay periods 
following an initial breach reset the two-year statute of limitations.57  
More specifically, the issue is whether a single breach occurs at the 
 
 51. Compare Act of Apr. 23, 1945, ch. 513, § 1, 1945 Minn. Laws 1006, 1006–
07, with MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010). 
 52. Though the legislature has expressly codified that the limitations period 
begins to run when the cause of action accrues, no statute specifically defines 
exactly when that accrual occurs.  MacRae v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 
711, 716 (Minn. 2008).  This has left courts with the burden of ascertaining exactly 
when a particular cause of action accrues.  See, e.g., Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 
Minn. 147, 152–53, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968) (holding that a cause of action 
accrues when all of the elements of the action have occurred and the claim would 
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Minnesota Rules of 
Civil Procedure 12.02(e)).  Courts thus have been given some discretion in the 
application of the statute of limitations based on when they determine a claim 
could survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  See Herbert v. City of 
Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008) (“When reviewing a case 
dismissed . . . for failure to state a claim . . . the question before [the reviewing] 
court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.”). 
 53. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 2011). 
 54. MINN. STAT. § 541.01 (2010); see also Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 
201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694, 697 (1937) (“It is also a well-established rule 
that the statute ‘commences to run against a cause of action from the time it 
accrues—in other words from the time an action thereon can be commenced.’”). 
 55. In the context of wage recovery, the two-year limitations period is applied 
whenever “the gravamen of the action is the breach of an employment contract.”  
Portlance v. Golden Valley State Bank, 405 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1987). 
 56. See Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1205 (discussing four possible 
results stemming from the application of the statute of limitations to continuing or 
repeated wrongs). 
 57. See Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Drawing 
the line between something that amounts to a ‘fresh act’ each day and something 
that is merely a lingering effect of an earlier, distinct, violation is not always 
easy.”). 
9
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initial wrongful act (starting a single limitations period) or whether 
affected pay periods following the initial act constitute multiple 
breaches (starting separate limitations periods with each breach).58  
These competing approaches to ascertaining when a breach has 
occurred were nicely summarized by the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals in Tull v. City of Albuquerque.59 
In Tull, city employees brought an action against the City for 
breach of employment contract after the City violated a merit 
system ordinance when it expanded city employees’ job duties 
without increasing their pay.60  The City argued that the employees’ 
action, brought in 1994, was time-barred under New Mexico’s 
three-year statute of limitations, because the alleged breach 
occurred only once in 1987, upon the City’s initial failure to give 
the requisite pay raise.61  The city employees argued that a new 
breach of contract occurred with each defective paycheck that did 
not include the raise to which they were entitled, and as such, they 
could recover damages for all paychecks that did not include the 
raise during the three years preceding the filing of their complaint, 
as well as all defective paychecks issued since the complaint was 
filed.62  The New Mexico Court of Appeals coined the term 
“continuing-wrong theory” to describe the city employees’ 
argument, and the term “single-wrong with continuing effects” 
theory to refer to the City’s argument.63 
With no clarification by the state legislature as to which 
competing theory applies, Minnesota courts have been left with 
 
 58. See Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1205.  Compare Botten v. 
Shorma, 440 F.3d 979, 980–81 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a separate cause of 
action for bonuses accrued with each date a bonus was due under agreement), 
Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989) (holding that each failure to 
pay yearly commissions constituted a new cause of action from which the 
limitations period would run), and Wood v. Cullen, 13 Minn. 394, 397 (1868) 
(holding that a separate limitations period began to run from each missed 
installment of wages when they became due), with Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson 
& Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a new cause of 
action did not accrue for failure to promote following the employer’s earlier 
wrongful refusal to hire), Press v. Howard Univ., 540 A.2d 733, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (holding that continuing damages in the form of lost income flowed from a 
single breach), and Tull v. City of Albuquerque, 907 P.2d 1010, 1011–12 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1995) (finding that lower paychecks were merely damages resulting from a 
single, actionable wrong). 
 59. 907 P.2d at 1010. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1011. 
 62. Id. at 1010–11. 
 63. Id. at 1011. 
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considerable discretion when applying the statute.64  Early 
Minnesota cases seemed to follow the continuing-wrong theory65 in 
wage recovery claims,66 but some lower courts have distinguished 
the accrual of claims for the nonpayment of wages from the accrual 
of other types of contract claims.67  The judicial tendency to count 
affected pay periods as separate breaches appeared to continue 
through to at least 1989, when the Minnesota Supreme Court 
seemingly reaffirmed application of the continuing-wrong theory in 
Levin,68 which serves as the primary point of authority in support of 
the continuing-wrong argument raised in Park Nicollet.69 
III. THE PARK NICOLLET DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Plaintiff, Arlyn Hamann, M.D., began employment with 
Defendant, Park Nicollet Clinic,70 in 1974, as a physician in the 
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department71 of Park Nicollet’s Saint 
Louis Park clinic.72  Hamann’s duties included occasionally seeing 
 
 64. MacRae v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 2008) 
(“Although the limitations period begins to run when the cause of action accrues, 
the statute does not define when such accrual occurs.”). 
 65. See Tull, 907 P.2d at 1011 (coining the terms “continuing-wrong” and 
“single-wrong with continuing effects” to describe the competing arguments for 
when a breach of employment contract occurs). 
 66. See, e.g., Wood v. Cullen, 13 Minn. 394, 397 (1868). 
 67. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Datatrak Int’l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 893 (D. Minn. 
1999) (holding that when the underlying claim is based on an ongoing 
nonpayment of wages, the cause of action accrues separately each time a payment 
is due but not paid); Guercio v. Prod. Automation Corp., 664 N.W.2d 379, 387 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“A breach-of-contract cause of action accrues generally at 
the time of the breach, even if the damages do not manifest themselves until 
later . . . .  But under Minnesota law, a contractual cause of action for lost wages 
arises each time a payment is due, but is not paid.” (citations omitted)). 
 68. Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989) (holding that each 
failure to pay commissions constitutes a separate breach). 
 69. See infra Part III.B. 
 70. Park Nicollet Health Services is a nonprofit, integrated healthcare system 
located in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, with more than 8200 employees, including 
more than 1000 Park Nicollet physicians on staff.  About: Overview, PARK NICOLLET 
HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.parknicollet.com/About (last visited Oct. 8, 2012). 
 71. Obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) are two medical specialties that 
deal with the female reproductive organs in the pregnant and non-pregnant state, 
respectively.  See Definition of Obstetrician/gynecologist, MEDICINENET.COM, http:// 
www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=7877 (last visited Oct. 8, 
2012). 
 72. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 2011). 
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obstetrics patients during nights and weekends.73  These “night 
call[s]”74 involved working before or after normal business hours.75 
In 1995,76 Park Nicollet adopted a Length of Service 
Recognition Policy (the “Policy”) that applied to all physicians in 
the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, including Hamann.77  
The Policy was intended to encourage physicians to remain with 
Park Nicollet by rewarding their length of service with the 
company.78  The Policy rewarded physicians by exempting them 
from the night call obligation once they met the Policy’s 
requirements.79  To be exempt from taking night calls under the 
Policy, physicians were required to: “(1) be at least 60 years of age; 
(2) have at least 15 years of taking OB call; (3) be at least a two-
thirds full-time employee; and (4) have the approval of physicians 
in the call rotation.”80  Following adoption of the Policy, at least one 
physician was able to exercise his rights under the Policy and 
discontinue night calls without a reduction in salary.81 
Hamann became eligible to receive benefits under the Policy 
in 2004, but when he informed the department chair of his intent 
to exercise the Policy, he was convinced to defer exercising his 
rights until April 2005 because of staffing concerns in the 
department.82  When Hamann renewed his request to stop taking 
night calls in April 2005, the department chair stated that “the 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 830 n.1 (“[N]ight call” is the term used by the parties for seeing 
patients outside of normal business hours.). 
 75. Id. at 830. 
 76. By 1995, Hamann had been employed by Park Nicollet for twenty-one 
years.  Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  The Policy was adopted in an effort to encourage department 
physicians to remain with Park Nicollet for a long period of time so as to promote 
continuity and help maintain adequate staffing.  Brief for Respondent at 4, Park 
Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d 828 (No. A10-658), 2011 WL 7415272, at *4.  The Policy also 
helped to reduce the costs of physician turnover while ensuring patient needs 
were met by experienced physicians.  Id. 
 79. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at *4. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 830.  Dr. Edward Maeder, another physician 
in Hamann’s department, was allowed to exercise his rights under the Policy when 
he became eligible upon his sixtieth birthday.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 
78, at *6.  
 82. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at *6.  Hamann became eligible 
under the Policy upon his sixtieth birthday in 2004, but, in an effort to avoid 
potential staffing issues, the department chair convinced Hamann to defer 
exercising his rights until April 2005 because a number of department physicians 
were on maternity leave.  Id. 
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Policy no longer existed and would no longer be honored,” and if 
he stopped taking night calls his salary would be cut.83  Hamann 
initially elected to continue taking night calls rather than have his 
salary reduced.84  Three years later, however, in February 2008, 
Hamann was ultimately forced to stop taking night calls because of 
health reasons.85  In response to Hamann’s withdrawal, and 
consistent with the terms of the original employment agreement, 
Park Nicollet reduced his salary.86 
Following the salary reduction, Hamann brought suit against 
Park Nicollet in October 2009, more than three years after Park 
Nicollet’s initial refusal to honor the Policy.87  The complaint 
alleged claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and 
unjust enrichment.88  In lieu of answering, Park Nicollet filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim89 on grounds that 
Minnesota’s two-year statute of limitations for wage recovery90 had 
run and the claims were time-barred.91  The trial court granted Park 
Nicollet’s motion, holding that Hamann’s claim was barred under 
either the two- or three-year statute of limitations92 because Park 
Nicollet’s breach occurred more than three years prior, in 2005, 
when Hamann first learned that he would not be permitted to 
exercise the Policy.93 
 
 83. Id. at *6–7. 
 84. Id. at *7.  Hamann alleged that he was compelled by the department chair 
to continue taking night calls and doing so in his early sixties “adversely affected 
his health.”  Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, No. 27-CV-09-28698, 2010 WL 2650383, 
at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 792 N.W.2d 468 
(Minn. Ct. App.), rev’d, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011), 2010 WL 2782072.  
 88. Id.  Hamann also alleged misrepresentation and failure to pay wages, but 
later voluntarily dismissed those claims.  Id. 
 89. MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e); Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, 792 N.W.2d 
468, 470 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011). 
 90. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010). 
 91. Hamann, 792 N.W.2d at 470. 
 92. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 2011).  
Because Hamann’s claims were possibly barred by both the two-year limitations 
period as well as the three-year exception provided for “willful” nonpayment, the 
issue of whether Park Nicollet’s alleged behavior was willful was not discussed.  Id. 
at 832 n.3; see also MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (providing a three-year limitations 
period for “willful” nonpayment of wages).  For further analysis of the three-year 
exception for willful nonpayment specifically see Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1989). 
 93. Hamann, 2010 WL 2650383, at *8. 
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B. The Court of Appeals Decision 
Hamann appealed the trial court’s dismissal, arguing that the 
limitations period had not run because his claim was based on a 
series of ongoing breaches that occurred with every reduced 
paycheck he received.94  Hamann further argued that Park 
Nicollet’s initial refusal to honor the Policy was not an outright 
breach of any present contractual duty, but rather a repudiation of 
a future obligation, which does not start the statute of limitations 
until the time for performance comes due.95  Hamann relied 
extensively on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s prior decision in 
Levin,96 which seemingly endorsed Minnesota’s application of the 
continuing-wrong theory in wage recovery cases.97 
In Levin, the plaintiff had a contract with his employer that 
stipulated he would be paid a commission, in addition to salary, 
based on a portion of the company’s annual sales.98  In 1982, Levin 
received his first commission check, but received no commission 
checks for subsequent years.99  When Levin inquired about his 
unpaid commissions in 1984, his employer made statements that 
implied none would be paid.100  In October 1986, Levin brought an 
action to recover the outstanding commissions.101 
Levin’s employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
the claim was barred by the two-year102 statute of limitations.103  The 
district court granted the motion, and the court of appeals 
affirmed.104  Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the breach 
stemming from a failure to pay commissions could only occur at 
the close of a given sales year when the amount of the commission 
 
 94. Hamann, 792 N.W.2d at 470–71. 
 95. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 837; see also Matteson v. Blaisdell, 148 Minn. 
352, 355, 182 N.W. 442, 443 (1921) (“A verbal denial of the existence of a contract 
or a declaration of an intention not to comply with its terms by one of the parties, 
prior to the time he is required to perform the same and after the other party has 
fully performed, does not set the statute of limitations running as against the other 
party.”). 
 96. Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989). 
 97. See Hamann, 792 N.W.2d at 471. 
 98. Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 802. 
 99. Id. at 803. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010). 
 103. Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 803. 
 104. Id. 
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check could be calculated.105  The court held that the outstanding 
commission checks constituted a series of breaches rather than the 
single breach that Levin’s employer had alleged.106  Because each 
failure to pay a given year’s commission created a new cause of 
action that started a separate limitations period, the court held that 
Levin’s claim was not time-barred under the statute of limitations.107 
The court of appeals agreed with Hamann and found Levin to 
be controlling.108  Park Nicollet argued that the case was 
distinguishable because Levin involved an installment contract that 
came due only at a predetermined date in the future.109  The 
appellate court rejected this distinction, concluding that “Park 
Nicollet had a future obligation to pay or provide specific benefits 
to Dr. Hamann at certain stated intervals for an indefinite period 
into the future,”110 and “fixed due dates were not a critical factor in 
the Levin court’s analysis.”111  The appellate court reversed the 
district court’s dismissal, holding that Hamann’s claim was not 
time-barred because a new cause of action for the recovery of wages 
accrued each time a payment was due, but not paid, by Park 
Nicollet.112 
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
Park Nicollet appealed the reversal.113  On appeal, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether 
each paycheck issued after an alleged breach of contract resets the 
two-year limitations period for wage recovery claims.114  The 
question required the court to expand on its analysis in Levin115 and 
to specifically weigh in on the competing single-wrong and 
continuing-wrong theories used by lower courts in applying the 
statute of limitations to employment contract disputes.116 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, 792 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 109. Id. at 472. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 2011). 
 114. Id. at 832. 
 115. Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989). 
 116. See supra Part II.D. 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’ 
holding that each paycheck created a separate cause of action 
under the continuing-wrong theory.117  The court acknowledged 
and endorsed its application of the continuing-wrong theory in 
Levin, but found the facts of the case to be distinguishable,118 
emphasizing that, unlike Hamann’s salary, the commission 
payment obligation in Levin, if any, was distinct from that in any 
other year because it could only be determined at the close of a 
given sales year.119  The court focused on the distinction between 
present and future contractual obligations—a distinction that the 
court of appeals did not believe to be critical120—and held that the 
continuing-wrong theory applies only where an employer has an 
ongoing future obligation to an employee.121 
The court concluded that the wrongful conduct alleged by 
Hamann was Park Nicollet’s decision to require physicians over age 
sixty to take night call.122  Beyond the promise contained within the 
Policy itself, Hamann alleged no other contractual provision or 
obligation binding Park Nicollet to the night call exemption.123  
Accordingly, the court found that Park Nicollet’s stated refusal to 
honor the Policy in 2005 constituted a breach of a present 
obligation because Park Nicollet’s performance became due 
immediately upon Hamann’s request to exercise.124  The 
subsequent reductions in Hamann’s salary represented damages 
stemming from a single actionable breach and not separate 
breaches in themselves.125 
In responding to Hamann’s repudiation argument, the court 
was similarly unconvinced.126  Hamann argued that Park Nicollet’s 
refusal in 2005 constituted a repudiation127 of a future obligation to 
 
 117. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 837. 
 118. Id. at 835. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, 792 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010) (“[F]ixed due dates were not a critical factor in the Levin court’s analysis.”). 
 121. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 835 (“In contrast to Levin, the obligation at 
issue in this case was not something that Park Nicollet was contractually or 
otherwise required to perform on an ongoing basis.”). 
 122. Id. (“The wrongful conduct at issue here, according to the complaint, is 
Park Nicollet’s decision to require that physicians over age 60 take night calls.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 836. 
 126. Id. at 837. 
 127. Id. (“An anticipatory repudiation . . . occurs when a promisor renounces a 
contractual duty [at some point] before the time for performance has arrived.”); 
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pay wages.128  His theory was that Park Nicollet’s performance was 
not due until he ceased taking night call, at which point Park 
Nicollet would have an obligation not to reduce his salary.129  
Hamann’s repudiation argument was also based on the Levin 
decision, in which the court found that the employer’s statement 
that he would not pay further commissions constituted an 
anticipatory repudiation of that employer’s future obligation to pay 
commissions.130 
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Hamann’s 
repudiation argument, distinguishing Levin the same way it did in 
disposing of Hamann’s continuing-wrong argument.131  The 
commission payment in Levin was a future obligation because it 
could only be calculated at the close of the sales year.132  The court 
held that Park Nicollet’s obligation under the Policy was not a 
future obligation because it became due at the time Hamann 
notified Park Nicollet of his intent to exercise the Policy.133  The 
court found that Park Nicollet’s obligation under the Policy was 
similar to a contract for payment on demand, and as such, 
performance was due when Hamann first demanded it in 2005, not 
when he stopped taking night calls in 2008.134  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that Hamann’s cause of action accrued once in 
 
see also Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 804–05 (Minn. 1989) (“[T]he 
renunciation and repudiation of a contract by one of the parties does not set the 
statute of limitation in motion against the other party although it gives the latter 
an election to sue immediately.” (citing Wold v. Wold, 138 Minn. 409, 415, 165 
N.W. 229, 231 (1917))); Statutes of Limitation, supra note 14, at 1207–08 (“[W]here 
the offending conduct precedes the date prescribed for the first performance to 
be rendered by the offending party . . . it may be desirable to have specially 
adapted rules.”). 
 128. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 837. 
 129. Id. at 838. 
 130. Id. (citing Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 804). 
 131. Id. at 837–38. 
 132. Id. at 837 (citing Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 804). 
 133. Id. at 838 (“But the breach at issue in this case . . . was not an obligation 
that would arise at some point in the future; it was an obligation owed to Hamann 
in April 2005, when Hamann demanded performance.”).  
 134. Id. at 838; see Bannitz v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. of Stevens Point, Wis., 
219 Minn. 235, 237, 17 N.W.2d 372, 373 (1945) (“Where it appears from a 
contract that it is the intention of the parties that the money or claim which is the 
subject matter thereof is to be paid upon a demand in fact, the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until an actual demand for payment is made.”).  
See generally J. A. Bock, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against 
Note Payable On Demand, 71 A.L.R.2D 284 (1960) (discussing contracts for payment 
on demand). 
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2005,135 and his claim, which he filed in 2009, was barred by the 
statute of limitations.136 
In assessing the application of the single- and continuing-
wrong theories, the court instructed lower courts to examine the 
nature of the alleged wrongful conduct in determining when a 
cause of action accrues.137  If the wrongful conduct is itself a failure 
to pay wages, then a cause of action may accrue, under the 
continuing-wrong theory, with each failure to pay wages when they 
become due.138  However, where wages are affected merely as a 
consequence of some other wrongful act, the single-wrong theory 
applies, and an actionable breach accrues only once, no matter 
how many pay periods are subsequently affected.139 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Park Nicollet decision narrows the application of the 
continuing-wrong theory which the court previously endorsed in 
Levin.  In holding that the continuing-wrong theory applies where 
an employer’s wrongful conduct is the express withholding of 
wages, but not where wages are effected merely as a consequence of 
some other breach,140 the Minnesota Supreme Court seems to 
effectively separate the breach of an employment contract from the 
impact it may have on employee’s future wage payments.  This rigid 
separation between cause and effect in breaches of employment 
contracts might unfairly limit employees’ ability to recover benefits 
owed to them under certain types of policies that are revoked 
before employees become eligible or elect to receive benefits. 
The potential issues facing employees that arise in the wake of 
the Park Nicollet decision can be illustrated by examining two 
elements that might disproportionately affect the beginning of the 
statute of limitations in breaches of employment contracts: 
eligibility requirements and the intent to exercise.  The eligibility 
element deals with how conditions precedent to receiving policy 
benefits affect the accrual of actions for breach of contract.  The 
intent element deals with how the subjective intent of an employee 
 
 135. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 836–37 (citing Tull v. City of Albuquerque, 907 P.2d 1010, 1011–13 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Press v. Howard Univ., 540 A.2d 733, 734–35 (D.C. 1988)). 
 138. Id. at 837. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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in his or her decision not to exercise elective policy benefits affects 
the accrual of a breach of contract action.  Both elements give rise 
to scenarios that demonstrate the potential problems employees 
may experience in pursuing future wage recovery claims. 
A. Eligibility Requirements May Lead to Inconsistent and Inequitable 
Application of the Statute of Limitations 
In the context of Park Nicollet, the eligibility element is raised 
by the issue of whether Hamann’s breach of contract action would 
have accrued if he had not met the Policy’s eligibility requirements 
at the time Park Nicollet informed him that the Policy would no 
longer be honored.141  This issue was recognized by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court but not addressed in the Park Nicollet opinion.142  In 
attempting to reconcile the issue with the court’s decision, there 
seem to be two possible alternatives: either Hamann’s cause of 
action accrued when he became eligible under the Policy’s 
requirements, or his cause of action accrued upon his notice of the 
Policy’s termination, regardless of whether he was eligible to 
receive the benefits. 
The first argument may be the most convincing, but seems 
likely to lead to claims with inconsistent and arbitrary results based 
on differences in eligibility between employees.143  Because Park 
Nicollet’s performance under the Policy would not come due until 
Hamann satisfied the Policy’s eligibility requirements,144 the 
eligibility requirements can be construed as conditions precedent 
to Park Nicollet’s performance.145  Termination or revocation of the 
 
 141. Such as if Park Nicollet provided a general notice to all employees 
informing them of the Policy’s revocation. 
 142. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 n.7. 
 143. To be eligible to “receive benefits under the Policy, a physician had to: 
(1) be at least 60 years old; (2) have ‘[a]t least fifteen years of taking OB [night] 
call;’ (3) be working at least two-thirds of a full-time position; and (4) have the 
approval of physicians in the ‘call rotation.’”  Id. at 830 (alterations in original). 
 144. See Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 
694, 697 (1937) (“Of course, ‘when a right depends upon some condition or 
contingency, the cause of action accrues and the statute runs upon the fulfillment 
of the condition or the happening of the contingency.’” (quoting 4 DUNNELL 
MINN. DIGEST, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 5602 (2d ed. 1927))); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981) (“Performance of a duty subject to a 
condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is 
excused.”). 
 145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (“A condition is an event, 
not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, 
before performance under a contract becomes due.”). 
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Policy before the conditions were satisfied would constitute a 
repudiation of Park Nicollet’s obligation146 and would not start the 
limitations period running against ineligible employees.147 
On the other hand, eligible employees, like Hamann, would 
experience an outright breach if the Policy were revoked or 
terminated, thus starting the limitations period on their claim 
immediately.148  Because eligible employees would be forced to sue 
within the limitations period, while ineligible employees could 
postpone the start of the limitations period indefinitely by refusing 
to satisfy any of the Policy’s conditions, different employees could 
have vastly different periods of time in which to litigate claims 
arising from the same wrongful conduct. 
Allowing some employees more time than others in which to 
bring a claim based on the same wrongful conduct would 
undermine the policy rationale behind having a limitations period 
in the first place.  Statutes of limitations are intended to reduce the 
inequities associated with forcing parties to defend claims after an 
unreasonable amount of time has passed in which evidence may 
have been lost or forgotten.149  Letting some employees bring a 
claim when it has been barred for others does not address those 
inequities.  An unreasonable amount of time for some employees 
could be much shorter than it would be others.  The fairness to an 
employer would be based not on the availability of evidence or on 
the amount of time that has passed since the wrongful conduct 
occurred, but on whether an employee satisfied arbitrary 
conditions that do not directly impact the conduct of the employer 
or  the  remedies  sought  by  the  employee.   Such  inconsistency  
 
 
 146. Id. § 250 (defining a repudiation as “a statement by the obligor to the 
obligee indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give 
the obligee a claim for damages for total breach”). 
 147. See Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1989) (holding 
that where a party to a contract declares “an intention not to comply with its terms 
prior to the time the declarant must perform,” the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 951 (1952) (“[T]he 
statutory period is held not to begin to run until the day set for the actual 
performance promised or until the injured party has definitely expressed his 
intention to regard the repudiation as a breach.”). 
 148. See Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 (“Hamann, having satisfied the 
eligibility criteria, triggered that obligation when he informed the Department 
Chair in April 2005 that he wished to ‘exercise the Policy.’  And Park Nicollet 
breached the obligation when the Department Chair declined to allow Hamann to 
do so.”). 
 149. Id. at 832. 
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emphasizes the arbitrary nature of limitations periods and does not 
promote the policy that justifies their use. 
The second argument seems like it could lead to even less 
desirable outcomes.  If Hamann’s cause of action accrued 
regardless of whether the eligibility requirements were satisfied, 
then he could be forced into a scenario that required him to 
choose between suing immediately for damages that may be 
uncertain, nonexistent, or too speculative to be recoverable,150 or to 
postpone bringing suit and risk being time-barred under the 
statute of limitations for waiting until harm actually manifests.151  In 
this scenario, ineligible employees, especially those that are many 
years away from becoming eligible, are the most vulnerable because 
calculating the exact impact of policy revocation or alteration could 
be extremely difficult.152 
Where an employer’s termination of a policy is found to be 
repudiation to employees who have not satisfied the eligibility 
requirements, additional factors may further complicate the 
decision of when to bring suit for promised benefits.  Typically, a 
defendant’s unequivocal repudiation excuses the plaintiff from 
performing any conditions precedent to the defendant’s promised 
performance.153  An employer’s repudiation of its policy obligations 
 
 150. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992) (“A 
party is entitled to recover for a breach of contract only those damages which: (a) 
arise directly and naturally in the usual course of things from the breach itself; or 
(b) are the consequences of special circumstances known to or reasonably 
supposed to have been contemplated by the parties when the contract was 
made.”); Sloggy v. Crescent Creamery Co., 72 Minn. 316, 318, 75 N.W. 225, 226 
(1898) (affirming dismissal of a breach of contract claim because nominal 
damages alone were insufficient to sustain a cause of action).  For a discussion on 
certainty as a limitation on damages, see generally JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI 
AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 14.8 (6th ed. 2009). 
 151. See Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. 
1999) (acknowledging that “the running of the statute [of limitations] does not 
depend on the ability to ascertain the exact amount of damages.”). 
 152. See Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (N.Y. 1858) (“It is a well established 
rule of the common law that the damages to be recovered for a breach of contract 
must be shown with certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture . . . .”). 
 153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 255 (1981) (“Where a party’s 
repudiation contributes materially to the non-occurrence of a condition of one of 
his duties, the non-occurrence is excused.”); CORBIN, supra note 147, § 970 (“If the 
time for defendant’s promised performance was not definitely fixed in the 
contract but the defendant promised to perform . . . as soon as the plaintiff should 
have performed certain conditions precedent, a repudiation by the defendant is 
regarded by all courts without exception, as a breach of the contract, creating an 
immediate right of action . . . .  All agree . . . that the defendant’s repudiation 
excuses the plaintiff from performing conditions precedent . . . .”); 13 SAMUEL 
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could thus be found to discharge any conditions precedent to 
employees receiving benefits under the repudiated policy, 
including eligibility requirements.154  Previously ineligible 
employees may then be able to bring an action immediately to 
recover promised benefits as if they were currently eligible, 
presumably increasing the certainty with which they would be able 
to prove damages.155 
The choice evoked by the second argument alludes to a 
broader problem.  Does the single-wrong theory allow employers to 
effectively revoke policies with impunity before employees become 
eligible for the future benefits?  Park Nicollet seems to have left 
employers with the opportunity to unilaterally alter or terminate 
employment policies before employees become eligible to exercise 
them, thus rendering any promised benefits illusory.156  In the 
context of other types of benefit policies, the consequences of 
allowing employers to alter the terms of an existing employment 
contract without employee assent become more apparent. 
As an example, in an at-will employment jurisdiction,157 
employers could attract employees with contract provisions 
guaranteeing job security.  Employers could then unilaterally 
eliminate the provision, allowing them to terminate the employees 
at any time, thus undermining the very benefits that the employees 
were promised initially.  Employees would be similarly forced to 
choose between suing immediately upon notice that the provision 
has been eliminated,158 or waiting until they are fired in a way that 
 
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 39:38, at 
670 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that the law “recognizes the obvious injustice of 
requiring the nonrepudiating party to perform [a condition] when the promisor 
has indicated that he or she will not keep his or her promise”). 
 154. See CORBIN, supra note 147, § 970. 
 155. See generally PERILLO, supra note 150, §§ 14.18–.19. 
 156. A promise is illusory where it “appears on its face to be so insubstantial as 
to impose no obligation at all on the promisor.”  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 2.13, at 75 (4th ed. 2004). 
 157. The typical employer-employee relationship is terminable at the will of 
either party, meaning that an employer can dismiss an employee at any time, and 
the employee is under no obligation to remain at the job.  Brown v. Safeway 
Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). 
 158. If an employee is not terminated outright, electing to sue immediately 
upon notice that the job security provision has been eliminated would likely pose 
difficulties in damage calculation.  See Farnsworth, supra note 156, § 8.20 
(“[A]ttempting to estimate damages in an action brought before the time for 
performance would be a ‘matter of pure speculation and guesswork.’” (quoting 
Charles Thaddeus Terry, Book Review, 34 HARV. L. REV. 891, 894 (1921))). 
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is counter to the terms of the original employment agreement.159  
By leaving the question of whether eligibility affects the accrual of a 
cause of action unanswered, the Minnesota Supreme Court may 
force some future employees to make a choice between recovering 
nominal damages immediately160 or not having a claim in the 
future. 
Both of the arguments pertaining to the eligibility element 
demonstrate the substantial issues that could be raised in future 
wage recovery claims in the wake of Park Nicollet.  On the one hand, 
some employees could arbitrarily postpone satisfying certain 
conditions, like eligibility requirements, in order to indefinitely 
maintain a cause of action.161  On the other hand, employers may 
be able to render promised policy benefits illusory by unilaterally 
revoking them before employees become eligible to receive them.  
Together, the issues highlight the important equitable 
considerations162 that must be weighed in establishing any kind of 
rigid standard for the application of the statute of limitations, 
should the Minnesota Supreme Court be called on to resolve the 
eligibility issue in the future.163 
B. Withholding Demand for Benefits May Postpone the Start of the 
Limitations Period 
In addition to the substantial effect that eligibility 
requirements seem to have on the accrual of wage recovery actions, 
whether an employee intends to exercise those benefits after 
becoming eligible to receive them may also have important 
implications.  If Hamann was eligible for benefits under the Policy 
 
 159. If an employee is terminated more than three years after first receiving 
notice of the job security provision’s elimination, they may risk having their claim 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
 160. Sloggy v. Crescent Creamery Co., 72 Minn. 316, 318, 75 N.W. 225, 226 
(1898) (affirming dismissal of a breach of contract claim because nominal 
damages alone were insufficient to sustain a cause of action). 
 161. See Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 2011) 
(discussing eligibility requirements under the Policy). 
 162. See WOOD, supra note 13, § 5. 
 163. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1945) (weighing 
the practical benefits of the statute of limitations against constitutional 
considerations); see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463–64 
(1975) (“[T]he period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value 
judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid 
claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale 
ones.”).  
23
Whatley: Contracts: Will Work for Promises: Wage Payments do not Reset the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012
  
2012] WILL WORK FOR PROMISES 395 
in April 2005 but opted not to exercise his rights, perhaps because 
he enjoyed taking night call or due to the needs of his patients, 
would the breach action still have accrued in 2005?  This element 
was touched on in the court’s rejection of Hamann’s repudiation 
argument, and its significance is illustrated in the way the court 
characterized the Policy as being similar to a contract that calls for 
payment on demand.164 
The court framed Park Nicollet’s obligation under the Policy 
as being analogous to a contract for payment on demand, making 
Park Nicollet’s performance due when Hamann demanded it.165  
“Where a condition precedent to a right of action exists, the cause 
of action does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not 
begin to operate until the condition is performed.”166  Further, 
“where the parties so frame their contract as to make prior 
demand . . . a condition precedent to a right to sue, the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until demand is made.”167  The 
implication thus seems to be that if Hamann had not made the 
demand to exercise his benefits, the cause of action would not have 
accrued until he actually stopped taking night call. 
Under the court’s reasoning, if Hamann had not made the 
request to exercise Policy benefits, Park Nicollet’s performance 
could not have come due.168  Any affirmative notice that the Policy 
had been revoked or terminated,169 occurring prior to a demand 
for Policy benefits, would serve as a repudiation of a future 
obligation, rather than as an immediate breach of a present 
obligation.170  “Where a party to a contract does nothing more than 
 
 164. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 (“[T]he Policy is similar to a contract 
calling for payment on demand.”). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Cummins & Walker Oil Co., Inc. v. Smith, 814 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
 167. Id. at 887; accord Bannitz v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. of Stevens Point, Wis., 
219 Minn. 235, 237, 17 N.W.2d 372, 372 (1945) (“Where it appears from a 
contract that it is the intention of the parties that the money or claim which is the 
subject matter thereof is to be paid upon a demand in fact, the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until an actual demand for payment is 
made . . . .”). 
 168. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 (“As soon as Hamann had satisfied the 
conditions of the Policy and informed the Department Chair that he wished to 
exercise the Policy and stop taking night call, Park Nicollet had a duty to 
perform.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 169. Such as if Park Nicollet were to release a department-wide bulletin that 
provided notice of the Policy’s termination. 
 170. Performance under a contract becomes due only when all necessary 
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declare ‘an intention not to comply with its terms prior to the time 
the declarant must perform,’ the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run.”171  An employee’s subjective intent to invoke policy 
benefits by requesting them thus becomes the difference between 
construing the termination of a policy as a repudiation rather than 
an outright breach, which has a substantial impact on the 
application of the statute of limitations.172 
Alternatively, by interpreting elective policy benefits as being 
due upon demand, the court may actually be doing employees a 
favor in future efforts to recover under altered or terminated 
policies.  Notwithstanding the effect that eligibility requirements 
and other conditions may have on claim accrual, Minnesota is 
among a minority of states that do not allow an employer to 
unilaterally alter or terminate the various provisions of an 
employment contract.173  Under this minority rule, Park Nicollet 
need only have provided an unqualified assertion that the Policy 
had been revoked or terminated to be considered in breach and to 
start the limitations period running against all affected 
 
conditions have occurred.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 cmt. b 
(1981).  An anticipatory repudiation occurs when a promisor renounces a 
contractual duty before the time for performance has passed.  See Wold v. Wold, 
138 Minn. 409, 415, 165 N.W. 229, 231 (1917); see also WILLISTON & LORD, supra 
note 153, § 38.7, at 394, 405 (stating that a condition precedent “must be 
performed or happen before a duty of immediate performance arises on the 
promise which the condition qualifies” and that “a promisor’s duty does not 
become absolute unless and until a condition precedent occurs”).   
 171.  Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d 828, 837 (quoting Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1989)). 
 172. Where a party repudiates a future obligation, the statute of limitations 
does not run until the time for performance has arrived, even though the injured 
party has the right to sue immediately.  Id. at 838.  Where a party fails to perform 
an obligation at the time performance is due, that party has breached by 
nonperformance and the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon 
the breach, regardless of whether damages have occurred.  See 8 DUNNELL MINN. 
DIGEST CONTRACTS § 12 (5th ed. 2009) (“A breach of contract occurs when one 
party renounces liability under the contract, [or] totally or partially fails to 
perform . . . .”). 
 173. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629–30 (Minn. 1983) 
(holding that the indefinite duration of an employment contract does not by itself 
preclude the enforceability of unilaterally created provisions of employee 
handbooks, including job security provisions).  In a majority of jurisdictions, 
contract provisions unilaterally enacted by the employer are unenforceable in an 
action for breach of contract and, as a result, employers may unilaterally alter or 
terminate such provisions after a reasonable time if employees are given 
reasonable notice and the modification does not affect any vested employee 
benefits.  Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 76−77 (Cal. 2000). 
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employees.174  In finding that the Policy required Hamann’s request 
to exercise before Park Nicollet’s performance became due, the 
court may have provided employees with an argument that the 
unilateral modification or termination of an elective policy is an 
anticipatory repudiation rather than an outright breach, thus 
postponing the start of the limitations period. 
Given that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not specifically 
address the effect that eligible employees withholding demand for 
benefits may have on the accrual of a cause of action, it is unclear 
exactly how significant the intent element is in the Park Nicollet 
holding.  The court characterized the Policy as being similar to a 
contract for payment on demand, but it did not go so far as to 
extend that characterization to other elective benefit policies.175  
Further, the court did not engage in any broader discussion about 
employers’ ability to unilaterally alter employment contracts.  This 
makes it at least possible for employers to simply revoke demand 
provisions prior to eliminating a policy entirely so as to 
unequivocally start the limitations period for all employees upon 
notice, regardless of whether demand is made. 
By not addressing whether Park Nicollet would have 
committed a breach in 2005 if Hamann had not requested 
performance, the court may leave some employees with the ability 
to postpone the start of the limitations period by withholding 
demand for benefits when a policy is terminated.  Employees could 
thus have very different times in which to bring a claim based on an 
employer’s single wrongful act.  At the very least, employers may 
have an incentive to ensure provisions of employment contracts are 
drafted in a way that does not tie employer performance to 
employee demand.  Without further clarification, however, 
employers may find themselves defending wage recovery actions 
based on policies revoked many years ago. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Park Nicollet highlights many complex issues that arise out of 
the complicated interplay of legal and equitable principles in 
employment contract disputes.  Theories of contract law ensuring 
employees have adequate time to bring valid claims against their 
employers must be reconciled against equitable principles 
 
 174. Asmus, 999 P.2d at 76−77. 
 175. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838. 
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arbitrarily limiting that time for the sake of fairness and judicial 
economy.  The legislative trend toward shorter limitations periods, 
coupled with increasingly rigid judicial standards for determining 
when the period starts to run, reflects a cost-benefit analysis that 
seems to prioritize reducing the number of claims in Minnesota 
courts.  On an individual level, the shorter limitations periods and 
stricter application standards may result in greater numbers of 
legitimate claims being denied access to recovery.  But on a larger 
scale, employees will be discouraged from sleeping on their rights 
in a way that prejudices employers and unduly burdens an 
increasingly strained legal system. 
More specifically, however, by limiting the application of the 
continuing-wrong theory to only those employment contract claims 
where the wrongful conduct is the refusal to pay wages itself,176 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has potentially restricted employees’ 
ability to recover future benefits promised under policies that are 
revoked before they become eligible to receive them.  Though the 
decision is consistent with a broader trend aimed at keeping 
limitations periods short and starting them early,177 it does not seem 
to adequately address countervailing interests of ensuring that 
plaintiffs have sufficient time to litigate legitimate disputes.178  At 
worst, Park Nicollet may force future employees to choose between 
the practical viability of bringing a claim immediately and the 
increased likelihood of having a claim barred outright by waiting 
until harm actually manifests.  At best, the issues not addressed in 




 176.  Id. at 837. 
 177.  See Littell, supra note 14, at 37–38 (discussing the shift from longer 
general statutes of limitations to shorter periods in more categorically 
differentiated statutes). 
 178.  See Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1190–91 (indicating that 
legislatures may generally limit or shorten the time within which actions may be 
brought if there is a reasonable time left for the plaintiff to sue so as not to offend 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  See generally WOOD, supra 
note 13, § 5. 
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